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In this paper, we examine the rationale for dollar and euro pegging in Russia and the 
CIS.  We consider macroeconomic stabilization and transaction costs for international trade as 
rationales for pegging to the euro. Dollarization of international assets and liabilities are ex-
amined as determinants of exchange rate stabilization against the dollar. The impact of net-
work externalities from a common anchor for all CIS countries is explored. Tests on de facto 
exchange rate stabilization reveal that dollar pegging has been pervasive in the CIS. 
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1.  Introduction 
The rising U.S. twin deficit and the sustained fall of the U.S. dollar have triggered sig-
nificant increases of foreign reserves and the money supply in countries pegging their ex-
change rates to the dollar. Reflecting the dynamics of increasing international imbalances in-
volving the U.S. currency, the Central Bank of Russia announced plans to give a higher 
weight to the euro in its daily exchange rate operations in early 2005. The chances of the euro 
becoming an anchor currency for the Russian ruble seem realistic from the perspective of 
macroeconomic stabilization and transactions costs for international trade. Since the euro has 
evolved into an international currency, it may qualify as a credible anchor for Russian mone-
tary policy. Because the EU25 is Russia’s most important trading partner, transaction costs for 
Russian trade would decline.  
However, exchange rate stabilization against the dollar has persisted in Russia up to 
late 2004. Several papers elaborate the rationale for dollar or euro pegging in Russia and the 
CIS. Rautava (2004) examines the role of oil prices and the real exchange rate in Russia’s 
economy using a vector autoregression framework and finds that Russian economic perform-
ance is influenced strongly by both factors. From this perspective large inflows of petro dol-
lars may explain dollar pegging.  Keller and Richardson (2003) identify the dollarization of 
Russia’s international and domestic assets and liabilities as the motivation for stabilizing ex-
change rates against the dollar. If the CIS economies remain highly dollarized, reducing ex-
change rate volatility against the dollar is equivalent to enhancing financial stability.  
Taking the increasing importance of international capital flows for exchange rate stabi-
lization into account, we test for de facto exchange rate stability of the CIS currencies against 
the dollar and euro. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides 
the rationale for exchange rate stabilization in the CIS countries and identifies the euro as a 
candidate for the nominal anchor. Although exchange rate policy in these countries has fol-
lowed dollar pegging for most of the period, de-dollarization pressures are identified. Section   3
3 considers the network externalities of using an informal common anchor for the CIS coun-
tries.  Section 4 establishes the de facto exchange rate stability of the currencies in these coun-
tries before and after the Russian crisis.  Section 5 concludes with some observations about 
the possibility of shifting from a dollar peg to a euro-based anchor.  
2.  Determinants of Exchange Rate Stabilization in the CIS 
McKinnon and Schnabl (2004a, 2004b) provide the rationale for applying the fear of 
floating argument of Calvo and Reinhart (2002) to developing and emerging market countries. 
They argue that exchange rate regimes are not chosen exogenously based on specific targets 
of economic policy making, e.g., reducing the risk of a speculative crisis. Rather, the regime 
choice is endogenously determined by several inherent and interdependent factors, e.g., mac-
roeconomic stabilization, dollar or euro invoicing of international trade, and dollar or euro 
denomination of international capital flows.  
The euro qualifies as an anchor currency for the CIS for two reasons. First, the Euro 
Area constitutes a large closed economy having a large volume of international trade. Infla-
tion is low and government debt in the Euro Area, which may be taken as a proxy for future 
inflation, is moderate on average. Since capital markets are highly developed, the EMU mem-
ber states are able to lend and to borrow internationally in the domestic currency. Monetary 
policy is focused purely on the domestic economy and the euro is floating freely without note-
worthy foreign exchange intervention. Hence, the euro qualifies as an anchor currency for the 
CIS. 
Second, from the perspective of the CIS, the attractiveness of the euro as an anchor 
currency is enhanced by a high degree of economic integration with the EU25. As shown in 
Figure 1, trade with the EU25 ranged from 10% in the Kyrgyz Republic to 50% in Azerbaijan 
in 2003.  As an arithmetic average, trade with the EU25 is 30% second only to intra-CIS trade 
at 38%. In addition, Russia, which is the largest economy in the region, transacts 50% of its   4
trade with the EU25 and only 18% with the smaller CIS economies. By contrast, trade with 
the U.S. is negligible. If the CIS currencies are re-pegged gradually from the euro to the dol-
lar, a larger part of CIS trade would profit from lower exchange rate risk and this percentage 
will increase in the future as the euro zone expands.  
Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) and McKinnon and Schnabl (2004b) demonstrate 
that international capital flows have gained increasing importance as an explanation of ex-
change rate policies. The incentive for exchange stabilization arises from the fact that private 
and public agents in developing and emerging market countries are unable to borrow or to 
lend in their domestic currencies. Eichengreen and Hausmann argue that the rationale for ex-
change rate stabilization in emerging markets is due to underdeveloped capital markets. Be-
cause of a long tradition of inflation and depreciation, banks and enterprises in emerging mar-
ket and developing countries cannot use their currencies to borrow abroad or to borrow long-
term, even domestically.
2 International creditors lend in dollars or euros and, thereby, shift the 
exchange rate risk of open positions in foreign debt to the debtor countries. The consequence 
is either a currency mismatch, i.e., projects that generate domestic currency are financed with 
foreign currency, or a maturity mismatch, i.e., long-term projects are financed with short-term 
loans.  
Dollar or euro liabilization creates an incentive for exchange rate stabilization at both 
high frequencies, i.e., day-to-day or week-to-week exchange rate fluctuations, and low fre-
quencies, i.e., month-to-month or year-to-year exchange rate fluctuations. Most international 
short-term payment transactions of emerging market and developing countries are denomi-
nated in U.S. dollars or euros. The degree of dollarization of payment flows can be assumed 
to be even higher in dollarized regions such as the CIS, as Keller and Richardson (2003) dem-
onstrate. Oomes (2003) observes domestic payment dollarization in Russia for large house-
hold transactions as well as for intra-CIS trade.  Because domestic capital markets in emerg-
ing markets are underdeveloped and shallow, an active forward market in foreign exchange   5
against the dollar or euro is non-existent. If hedging instruments are available, individual 
owners of dollar liabilities consider the cost of forward cover, i.e. the premium on buying 
dollars forward with the domestic currency, to be too high. The foreign exchange risk of 
short-term capital transactions remains un-hedged typically. 
  The CIS governments can provide an informal hedge for private short-term capital 
transactions by keeping the exchange rate stable on a daily or weekly, i.e., high frequency,  
basis.  Then, private banks and enterprises can repay their short-term foreign currency liabili-
ties with minimal exchange rate risk. Such an exchange rate policy compensates for the un-
derdeveloped private market in forward exchange. Figure 2 shows day-to-day exchange vari-
ability of the CIS currencies against the dollar starting in January 1998 in comparison to the 
euro/dollar exchange rate, which is regarded as a benchmark freely floating rate. The daily 
exchange rate fluctuations of many CIS currencies, e.g., the Russian ruble, the Ukrainian 
hryvnia, the Kazakhstani tenge, and the Armenian dram, are considerably lower than the 
changes in the euro/dollar exchange rate.  
Given that lower exchange rate volatility against the dollar in comparison to the euro 
is due to foreign exchange intervention
3, CIS governments appear to be providing an insur-
ance mechanism for private short-term payment flows by reducing exchange rate volatility on 
a day-to-day basis. In contrast, European and U.S. enterprises rely on a well-developed do-
mestic bond market to hedge the foreign exchange exposures. Long-term forward markets, 
with a well defined forward premium equal to the interest differential between the two na-
tional bond markets at each maturity, allow hedging at low cost. 
At low frequencies, the rationale for exchange rate stabilization in debtor countries 
originates in long-term liability dollarization. If net debt is denominated in foreign currency, 
long-term exchange rate stability is equivalent to reducing default risk on balance sheets, as 
Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) argue. Exchange rate fluctuations affect the servicing and 
repayment domestic currency costs of foreign currency debt. Sharp depreciations put balance   6
sheets at risk, possibly forcing indebted enterprises and financial institutions into default. 
Even low-frequency exchange rate fluctuations around a constant level generate risk for fi-
nancial systems because increasing uncertainty is likely to be reflected in higher risk premi-
ums on domestic interest rates. To shield domestic enterprises and financial institutions 
against such risk in their balance sheets, the government can control low-frequency exchange 
rate fluctuations to enhance the stability of the domestic financial system. Empirical estima-
tions by Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2003) show that liability dollarization is preva-
lent in most emerging market and developing countries that tend to be international net debt-
ors.  
Accumulated current account balances can proxy for liquid international liabilities or 
assets which can be expected to react to changing exchange rate expectations. Many smaller 
CIS countries, e.g., Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova, have large current account 
deficits for more than a decade.  These deficits lead to increasing international debt and result 
in increasing risk of depreciation.  However, the risk of a reversal of short-term international 
capital inflows can be mitigated by FDI inflows. If current account deficits are financed 
mostly by foreign direct investment (FDI), as they are in Azerbaijan and Georgia, the threat of 
currency instability is mitigated. Net FDI inflows were substantial in some, but not all, 
smaller CIS countries. In general, FDI inflows tend to be less than current account deficits, 
which leads to a moderate built-up of liquid international liabilities. 
  In addition to dollarization of foreign liabilities, Keller and Richardson (2003) observe 
liability dollarization in domestic CIS capital markets in form of dollar bank loans or mort-
gages. Berg and Borensztein (2000) argue that CIS banks become even more vulnerable to 
exchange rate fluctuations.  
Although liability dollarization provides a rationale for exchange rate stabilization in 
some smaller CIS debtor countries, this argument does not pertain to Russia (and the 
Ukraine). Russia and more recently the Ukraine have been running sustained current account   7
surpluses so that they are becoming large and growing international creditors. Nonetheless, 
both countries stabilize their exchange rates against the dollar.  
McKinnon and Schnabl (2004b) explain the rationale for exchange rate stabilization in 
creditor countries that are not able to lend in their domestic currencies. Underdeveloped fi-
nancial markets, capital controls or the fact that dollar assets are a more reliable store of value 
than domestic currencies cause private investors to prefer dollar assets rather than claims on 
foreigners denominated in the domestic currency.  Conversely, the U.S. is the largest debtor 
country in the world yet it is not inclined to hold debts denominated in foreign currencies. The 
position of the U.S. dollar as the world’s prominent international currency allows U.S. private 
and public agents to borrow in domestic currency and shift the exchange rate risk of interna-
tional lending to the creditors.  
By fixing exchange rates at high frequencies, governments in developing and emerg-
ing market countries can hedge the risk of private, short-term international lending. If capital 
markets are underdeveloped, forward transactions by risk-averse CIS traders wanting to hedge 
their open positions in foreign exchange are difficult. Potential market makers, e.g., banks, 
cannot cover transactions that involve buying the domestic currency forward for dollars be-
cause no convenient array of interest-bearing liquid domestic bonds liquid of differing maturi-
ties is available. The government can provide an overall hedge by minimizing exchange rate 
fluctuations on a daily or weekly basis. Specifically, Russia, the Ukraine, and Kazakhstan are 
large exporters of raw materials and crude oil. Revenues from these transactions are invoiced 
in dollars so that exchange rate stabilization provides a hedge for short-term income flows.  
At low frequencies, the motivation for exchange rate stabilization by international 
creditor countries can be linked to the risk perceptions of private and public holders of net 
foreign currency assets. For example, Russia has run sustained current account surpluses over 
the decade leading to a build-up of liquid international dollar assets. Current account sur-
pluses had accumulated to approximately 240 billion U.S. dollars by 2004. This stock of in-  8
ternational assets can be assumed to be held mostly in U.S. government bonds. In addition to 
international assets, domestic assets in the CIS are held partly in U.S. dollars. Keller and 
Richardson (2003) distinguish asset dollarization in the form of dollar-denominated bank de-
posits, i.e., deposit dollarization, from holdings of dollar cash, i.e., currency dollarization. 
Figure 3 indicates that, despite the recent decline, more than 50% of private deposits at Rus-
sian and Ukrainian banks are held in foreign currency. 
If private Russian or Ukrainian investors accumulate their assets in U.S. dollars, ap-
preciations of the domestic currency will result in their savings loosing value in terms of the 
domestic currency. This fear of appreciation may be compensated by higher interest rates in 
the debtor country, as suggested by open interest rate parity. However, with varying interest 
rates in the anchor country, the risk perception may change. Depreciation pressure on the an-
chor currency may be sustained if inflationary expectations in the anchor country rise. Be-
cause long-term investment is more or less un-hedged, individual or institutional holders of 
large dollar assets will be increasingly at risk. For the highly dollarized economies of Russia 
and Ukraine, Oomes (2003) argues that expected appreciation may cause runs into the domes-
tic currency and result in de-dollarization. If private investors decide to repatriate their inter-
national assets, or decide to convert domestic dollar assets into domestic currency assets, the 
resulting appreciation of the domestic currency will erode the competitiveness of the domestic 
(export) industry and reduce the value of dollar assets in domestic balance sheets.  
Such a process of de-dollarization is observable in Figure 3. In both Russia and 
Ukraine, de-dollarization began in the new millennium when the dollar came under world- 
wide depreciationary pressure. The conversion of dollar assets into ruble assets puts pressure 
on the ruble to appreciate. The governments in Russia and Ukraine may attempt to dampen 
this pressure by foreign exchange intervention. In Figure 3, this intervention is observable by 
the rapid build-up of foreign reserves in the Russian central bank. A similar pattern is found in 
the Ukraine.  Private foreign assets are replaced by public foreign assets through official dol-  9
lar purchases. In this situation, the exchange rate is kept at levels that are perceived to be safe 
for domestic (export) enterprises and financial institutions.  
In summary, liability and asset dollarization provide a strong incentive for any indi-
vidual country in the CIS to peg its exchange rate to the dollar. The small CIS debtor coun-
tries may fear dollar appreciation; the large CIS creditors, specifically Russia, fear dollar de-
preciation. Frankel (1999) argues that no single currency regime is appropriate for all coun-
tries at all times.  Hence, we expect to find different exchange rate strategies for the two 
groups of countries. Nevertheless, Figures 4 and 5 demonstrate that both low frequency ex-
change movements and the trends of foreign reserves in most small CIS countries exhibit 
similar patterns to those found in Russia. Sharp depreciations and declining reserves during 
the Russian crisis and fast rising reserves and appreciation in the new millennium characterize 
all countries.  The smaller CIS countries follow the Russian exchange rate policy to sustain 
intra-regional trade relations and achieve macroeconomic stability. 
3.  Network Externalities of Common Informal Anchors 
Oomes (2003) attributes the persistence of dollarization in the CIS to domestic and in-
ternational network externalities in the use of U.S. dollars. Since trade flows in all CIS coun-
tries are denominated in dollars, trade invoicing in dollars reduces the transaction costs for 
intra-CIS trade. Figure 1 shows the regional composition of CIS trade with the U.S., with the 
EU25, and for intra-CIS trade. For the smaller CIS countries, the motivation for dollar peg-
ging does not depend on strong trade ties with the U.S. Trade with the U.S. as a percentage of 
overall trade ranges from close to 0% for Tajikistan to only 8.5% for Armenia. In contrast, 
intra-regional trade accounts for an average of almost 40% of the total trade of the CIS coun-
tries. Intra-regional trade is particularly high for the smaller CIS countries. By pegging to the 
same anchor as Russia, the smaller CIS countries create a zone of intra-regional exchange rate 
stability that reduces transaction costs for intra-CIS trade and payment flows.    10
Intra-regional exchange rate stability, which can be achieved by either exchange rate 
stabilization to a regional anchor currency, i.e., the Russian ruble, or to a common informal 
external anchor, can be assumed to contribute to macroeconomic stability in the region. Since 
Russia is the dominant economic power in the region, the smaller countries may avoid sharp 
exchange rate fluctuations against the Russian ruble. Given close economic linkages among 
the CIS countries and competition in third markets, e.g., the EU25, secular depreciations of 
individual currencies contribute to deflation in the neighboring countries. This action provides 
an incentive for these other countries to allow their currencies to depreciate. If such beggar-
thy-neighbor depreciations spread in a highly economically integrated region, macroeconomic 
stability is affected adversely, as McKinnon and Schnabl (2003) argue. The effect will be 
more pronounced the larger are the countries that choose to depreciate, the larger is the num-
ber of the depreciating currencies, and the more open are the smaller countries that are af-
fected by the neighbors’ depreciation policies.  
During the Russian crisis the collapse of the Russian ruble in August 1998 was fol-
lowed by sharp depreciations of most small CIS currencies including the Ukrainian hryvnia, 
as Figure 4 indicates. If the small CIS countries would have sustained their pegs to the dollar, 
the depreciation of the Russian ruble would have put substantial deflationary pressure on 
them. Only Armenia and Azerbaijan, for which trade is focused on the euro area, were able to 
avoid sharp depreciations. To this end, all smaller CIS countries that are still strongly inte-
grated with Russia or compete with Russia in third markets have an incentive to follow the 
depreciations of the ruble.  
Although competitive depreciations originate within a regime of a stable anchor cur-
rency and macroeconomic instability at the periphery, the inverse case may apply if monetary 
expansion in the anchor country accelerates.  Even if monetary expansion does not translate 
immediately into increasing consumer price inflation, it may affect inflationary expectations. 
Hence, private capital flows may be redirected towards the periphery. The resulting pressure   11
on the domestic currencies to appreciate can lead to different policy reactions at the periphery. 
The monetary authorities of large countries with deep capital markets may allow appreciation 
of their currencies. Smaller, more open, economies or countries in which growth depends 
strongly on exports may resist the pressure to appreciate. Large international creditors, e.g., 
Russia, may be attempting to absorb some part of the domestic currency purchases to shield 
holders of international assets against losses in their balance sheets.  
During the 1990s, Russia accumulated considerable amounts of international reserves 
through foreign exchange intervention, as Figure 5 shows. This build-up of official dollar re-
serves has accelerated beginning in early 2002 when the dollar came under sustained depre-
ciation pressure.  As a result, inflation may emerge in different sectors of the economy. At an 
earlier stage, stock and real estate markets may react strongly and asset price bubbles may 
occur.  At a later stage, consumer price inflation is likely to increase as observed recently in 
Russia
4  Faced with the danger of inflation, the governments at the periphery have two op-
tions. If the government is committed to a hard peg, as is the currently the case in the Ukraine, 
the build-up of foreign reserves will be rapid. Under a fixed peg, the scope for sterilization is 
limited so that it may be easier for other countries to let their currencies appreciate in a con-
trolled fashion, as Russia is doing.  Such a policy may reduce the risk of overheating. 
  However, once one country using the informal dollar standard chooses to allow its cur-
rency to appreciate, all others have an incentive to follow. With the appreciation of the Rus-
sian ruble, the exports of Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, and Ukraine either to Russia or to 
third markets become more competitive. Although the increase in exports may be beneficial 
to these countries initially, the additional growth stimulus may not be appropriate at a time of 
accelerating inflation. Hence, these countries may decide to counteract inflation by allowing 
their currency to appreciate. Since 2002, patterns of such competitive appreciations have 
emerged in the CIS. As Figure 4 indicates, the Georgian lari, the Kazakhstani tenge, the Kyr-
gyz som and the Tajik somoni started to appreciate against the dollar in line with the apprecia-  12
tion of the Russian ruble. In contrast, the Ukraine adhered to its hard dollar peg and now faces 
inflationary pressures.  
4.  De facto Exchange Rate Stability against Dollar  
Based on the rationale for exchange rate stabilization against the dollar or the euro, we 
test for de facto exchange rate stability against the dollar and the euro in the CIS countries. In 
general, these countries are regarded as highly dollarized economies pegging their exchange 
rate to the dollar. However, in February 2005 Russia announced plans to give a greater weight 
to the euro in its daily exchange rate operations.
5 Testing for exchange rate stability against 
the dollar and the euro nests a test for de facto exchange rate stability, versus de jure ex-
change rate stability, as Calvo and Reinhart (2002) undertake for a worldwide sample.
6 
To examine exchange rate stabilization against the dollar and the euro for CIS coun-
tries, different degrees of exchange rate stabilization are treated as pegging policy. While one 
group of countries, including the Ukraine, may choose a hard peg to the dollar, others may opt 
for a soft peg, i.e., more exchange rate flexibility while reducing sharp exchange rate fluctua-
tions at the same time on a daily, monthly, and yearly basis. To assess such de facto exchange 
rate stability, we use three criteria: monthly percentage exchange rate changes (ε), monthly 
percentage changes of official foreign reserves (ϕ1), and monthly absolute changes of foreign 
reserves normalized by the monetary base (ϕ2). These criteria are defined in Table 1 accom-
panied by their assigned probability limits. 
7 
Nominal exchange rate volatility (ε) is a robust indicator of exchange rate stabiliza-
tion.  In a world of free international movements of goods and capital, exchange rate volatil-
ity, e.g., the volatility of the euro/dollar rate, is high.  As Calvo and Reinhart (2002) assert, if 
the probability (P) is low, alternatively high, that monthly exchange rate changes fall outside 
an arbitrary band, e.g., ±2.5%, the currency can be considered to be fixed, alternatively freely   13
floating. We assume that standard deviations (σ) of the nominal exchange rates indicate ex-
change rate stabilization if they are significantly lower than those for the euro/dollar rate.  
Governments stabilize exchange rates by intervening in foreign exchange markets. To 
prevent the domestic currency from appreciating (depreciating), the monetary authorities sell 
(buy) domestic currency in exchange for dollars, euros, or yen. The stronger are the efforts to 
stabilize the exchange rate, the higher is the probability that monthly percent changes in offi-
cial foreign reserves (ϕ1) fall outside the predetermined band of ±2.5%.
8 Since percentage 
changes of foreign reserves may be affected by the accumulated stock of foreign reserves,
9 an 
alternative measure for exchange rate stabilization is added by normalizing the absolute 
changes of foreign reserves by the monetary base (ϕ2).
10 We set the arbitrary band width at 
±5.0%. 
We estimate the indicators of exchange rate stabilization for two periods.  The first pe-
riod runs from January 1995 to July 1998 and the second period goes from January 2000 to 
June 2004.  Hence, the first is before and the second is after the Russian crisis. The crisis pe-
riod is excluded from the sample to eliminate any excessive volatility in both exchange rates 
and foreign reserves due to the crisis. As a benchmark for the degree of exchange rate stabili-
zation, we take the euro/dollar because it is widely acknowledged to be a freely floating rate. 
Following Calvo and Reinhart (2002), we assume that exchange rate volatility of the CIS cur-
rencies that is lower than the volatility of the euro/dollar rate indicates foreign exchange in-
tervention by these governments.
11 
Table 2 reports the estimation results. The CIS countries pursued dollar pegging before 
the 1998 Russian crisis. Although exchange rate volatility for some CIS countries, e.g., Bela-
rus, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, is high, both indicators for the volatility of foreign reserves 
indicate exchange rate stabilization. The fluctuations of foreign reserves in all CIS countries 
are clearly higher than those for the benchmark free floaters, i.e., the U.S. and the Euro Area 
countries. In addition, the volatilities of the nominal dollar exchange rates are significantly   14
lower than for the euro/dollar in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Russia. Higher 
exchange rate volatility in Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and the 
Ukraine can be attributed to downward crawling pegs because the volatility of reserves is high 
in these countries. Fully flexible rates would imply high exchange rate volatility in combina-
tion with low volatility of reserves. 
  During the Russian crisis, which started in August 1998, all CIS currencies except for 
the Armenian dram and the Azerbaijan manat experienced sharp but controlled depreciations. 
The large increase in the volatility of both nominal exchange rates and foreign reserves cor-
roborates this point.
12  As Table 2 indicates,  we observe less nominal exchange rate volatility 
after than before the crisis for eight out of ten currencies: the Armenian dram, the Azerbaijan 
manat, the Belarusian ruble, the Kazakhstani tenge, the Kyrgyz som, the Russian ruble, the 
Tajik somoni, and the Ukrainian hryvnia. Only the Moldovan lei and the Georgian lari exhibit 
more de facto exchange rate volatility after the Russian crisis than they did before the crisis, 
although their volatility is still considerably less than the euro/dollar rate. The high volatility 
of foreign reserves in all countries corroborates with this finding. All CIS countries fix their 
exchange rates more or less tightly to the dollar, with multiple pegs in Turkmenistan and Uz-
bekistan, so that the CIS countries have adopted an informal dollar standard. 
A complementary test for exchange rate stability against the euro does not yield any 
evidence in favor of exchange rate pegging. As shown in Table 3, exchange rate variability of 
the CIS currencies against the euro is high. Hence, we conclude that the CIS countries consti-
tute a pure informal dollar zone. This finding confirms the strong impact of capital flow dol-
larization on CIS exchange rate policies, which seems to be more important to the choice of 
the anchor currency than strengthening trade linkages with the Euro Area countries.    15
5.  Conclusion  
In this paper, we investigate the role of macroeconomic stabilization, international 
trade, and underdeveloped capital markets in determining exchange rate policy in the CIS 
countries.  We find a strong rationale for dollar pegging of the CIS currencies originating in 
capital markets and strong intra-regional trade linkages, which is confirmed by tests for de 
facto exchange rate stability. Nevertheless, as dollar pegs have contributed to higher infla-
tionary pressure recently, the Central Bank of Russia has announced a revision of its exchange 
rate strategy.  Due to underdeveloped capital markets, a freely floating ruble is not a feasible 
policy option. Although the Russian economy is large and closed enough to provide an anchor 
currency for the smaller CIS economies, fear of floating is likely to persist because Russian 
capital markets will remain relatively underdeveloped in the near future. 
  Theoretically, the euro qualifies as an alternative anchor for the CIS countries due to 
strengthening trade relations with the EU25. The ongoing process of de-dollarization in these 
economies will facilitate a shift toward the euro. To this end, Russia may adopt a currency 
basket with a considerable weight placed on the euro. Once this process has proven to be sus-
tainable, the smaller CIS countries are likely to follow this policy to maintain intra-regional 
trade relations and macroeconomic stability.  How smoothly the transformation of the ex-
change rate systems toward more exchange rate stability against the euro will proceed may 
hinge on Russia’s oil and raw material exports. Since dollar invoicing of these primary prod-
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Table 2: Pre- and Post-Crisis CIS Exchange Rate Stabilization  
  Exchange Rate ($)  Foreign Reserves ($)  Foreign Reserves / Monetary Base 
 P  σ  P  σ  P  σ 
  Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
Armenia  9.30%  6.90%  1.36%  1.14%  83.72% 36.21% 17.21% 3.45%  67.44% 37.93% 17.44% 7.55% 
Azerbaijan  2.33%  0.00%  2.00%  0.21%  72.09% 56.90% 235.7% 8.01%  53.49% 55.17% 17.03% 17.45% 
Belarus  42.86%  26.32% 4.59%  2.17%  86.05% 71.93% 17.23% 12.62% 34.88% 42.11% 12.36% 9.06% 
Georgia  0.00%  6.90%  0.61%  1.33%  81.82% 60.34% 11.08% 6.93%  67.65% 22.41% 32.10% 4.82% 
Kazakhstan  23.26%  1.72%  2.21%  0.76%  74.42% 74.14% 10.06% 5.91%  46.51% 74.14% 9.81%  11.64% 
Kyrgyz Republic 18.60%  5.17%  2.95%  1.32%  82.86% 46.55% 19.87% 5.48%  48.57% 39.66% 8.68%  10.28% 
Moldova  0.00%  6.90%  0.64%  1.33%  67.44% 58.62% 15.25% 5.56%  51.16% 32.76% 14.94% 5.86% 
Russia  5.41%  0.00%  1.18%  0.82%  88.37% 70.69% 19.56% 5.33%  36.84% 46.55% 6.06%  4.92% 
Tajikistan  55.81%  21.05% 15.18% 2.05%  77.78% 60.34% 20.16% 9.48%  n.a.  53.45% n.a.  14.74% 
Ukraine  23.26%  0.00%  3.37%  0.26%  76.74% 86.21% 21.33% 8.30%  46.51% 32.76% 9.85%  4.88% 
US ($/€)  25.58%  34.48% 2.19%  2.53%  32.56% 31.05% 4.37%  2.38%  0.00%  0.00%  0.04%  0.12% 
Euro Area (€/$)  25.58%  34.48% 2.19%  2.53%  n.a.  10.34% n.a.  1.64%  n.a.  0.00%  n.a.  0.90% 
Source: IMF/IFS. Indicators as outlined in Table 1. P marks the probability that the respective criterion falls outside the predetermined 
band. σ marks the standard deviation of the respective indicator. “Pre” indicates the Russian pre-crisis period from January 1995 up to 
July 1998. “Post” indicates the Russian post-crisis period from January 2000 up to December 2004. For Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan no 
data are available.   20
 










  Exchange Rate € 
 P  σ 
  Pre Post Pre Post 
Armenia  25.38%  34.48%  2.34%  2.69% 
Azerbaijan  30.23%  32.76%  3.40%  2.56% 
Belarus  60.47%  43.86%  5.49%  2.87% 
Georgia  21.88%  44.83%  1.90%  2.86% 
Kazakhstan  27.91%  31.03%  3.52%  2.56% 
Kyrgyz Republic  41.86%  25.86%  3.68%  2.48% 
Moldova  27.91%  41.55%  2.46%  3.02% 
Russia  24.32%  31.03%  2.24%  2.54% 
Tajikistan  65.12%  42.11%  14.77%  2.69% 
Ukraine  44.12%  39.88%  4.49%  2.65% 
US ($/€)  25.58%  34.48%  2.19%  2.53% 
Euro Area (€/$)  25.58%  34.48%  2.19%  2.53% 
Source: IMF/IFS. P marks the probability that the respective criterion falls outside the pre-
determined band. The coefficient σ marks the standard deviation of the respective indica-
tor. “Pre” indicates the Russian pre-crisis period from January 1995 up to July 1998. 
“Post” indicates the Russian post-crisis period from January 2000 up to December 2004.   21
 






































Source: IMF/IFS. ARM = Armenia, AZB = Azerbaijan, BLR = Belarus, GEO = Georgia, KZH = 
Kazakhstan, KYZ = Kyrgyz Republic, MOL = Moldova, RUS = Russia, TJI = Tajikistan, TRK = 
Turkmenistan, UKR = Ukraine, UZB = Uzbekistan. Trade is defined as exports plus imports. 
   22 




























































































































































































Source: Bloomberg. Data for the Tajik somoni are not available. Volatility defined as daily dollar returns.  23
















































foreign reserves of Russia  (inversed right scale)
 
Source: IMF/IFS.   24 







































































































































































































































































German mark / euro 
Source: IMF/IFS. Note different scales.    25 













































































































































































































































































































































Source: IMF/IFS. Note different scales. Data for Uzbekistan and are not available.  26
 
                                                 
1   I thank Boris Kisselevsky, Vesa Korhonen, Nienke Oomes, Lúcio Vinhas de Souza, Adalbert 
Winkler and two anonymous referees for useful comments.   
2   Recently, in the new Central and Eastern European EU member states, long-term bond markets 
in domestic currencies have developed because the new EU members have the unique opportu-
nity to import the reputation of the European Central Bank by anticipating EMU membership. 
From a worldwide perspective, sustained appreciation expectations against the dollar have fa-
vored the issuance of more long-term bonds in some emerging markets, e.g. Brazil. 
3   This assumption is described in more detail in section 4.  
4   During the years 2002 and 2003, Russian inflation continued to decline despite the considerable 
build-up of foreign reserves and the resulting expansion of reserve money. This missing inflation 
puzzle can be explained by both price rigidities and de-dollarization, which increased the de-
mand for domestic currency (Ohnsorge and Oomes, 2004). 
5   http://www.cbr.ru/pwa.asp?file=050204_1027_bivalut.htm. 
6   Most CIS currencies are de jure classified as free or managed floaters.  
7   Interest rates may serve as an additional tool for exchange rate stabilization, but they may be 
subject to considerable bias due to official interest rate controls.  
8   Official foreign exchange reserves change not only through foreign exchange intervention but 
also for other reasons, such as government payments in foreign currency and interest receipts on 
foreign exchange reserves. Furthermore, the dollar value of foreign exchange reserves is altered 
if the dollar exchange rate of third reserve currencies changes. Nevertheless, high volatility of re-
serves is a clear indication of exchange rate stabilization. 
9   With high stocks of foreign reserves, percentage changes tend to decline. 
10   For this purpose, foreign reserves must be reconverted from dollars into domestic currency, 
which introduces a bias due to changes in the dollar exchange rates of other reserve currencies.   27
                                                                                                                                                                  
11  The less developed foreign exchange markets of the smaller countries may be not fully compara-
ble with the much deeper euro and dollar markets. However, we can assume that the volatility of 
the CIS currencies would be even higher than the euro/dollar volatility without intervention due 
to shallow foreign exchange markets.  Hence, our benchmark of comparison should be robust. 
12  The estimation results are not reported for the sake of brevity but are available from the author 
upon request. 